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Abstract
In this paper we experimentally investigate the extended game with observable delay of
Hamilton and Slutsky (Games Econ. Beh., 1990). Firms bindingly announce a production
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11 Introduction
There is substantial interest in the theoretical literature on endogenous timing in games. This
literature started with Saloner (1987), Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), and Robson (1990) and in-
cludes recent contributions by Amir and Grilo (1999), Matsumura (2002), Normann (2002) and van
Damme and Hurkens (2004). The basic questions these models try to answer is simple but signi￿-
cant. When are ￿rms likely to play either a simultaneous-move game or a sequential-move game?
In models with endogenous sequencing, the order of output or price decisions is not exogenously
speci￿ed. Instead, it is derived from ￿rms￿decisions in a timing game.
Several recent experiments have attempted to validate the theory empirically1 but support
for the theory was by and large not found. In these experiments, simultaneous-move Cournot
outcomes are modal￿ in contrast to the prediction. Even when sequential moves occur, Stackel-
berg leaders produce less than predicted while followers produce more (see also Huck, M￿ller and
Normann, 2001).
Why does theory perform rather poorly in experiments? The theory underlying the exper-
iments predicts the emergence of Stackelberg equilibria and typically there exist two Stackelberg
equilibria. This causes two problems. First, coordination problems occur in the experimental mar-
kets since either ￿rm may emerge as the Stackelberg leader. Neither Stackelberg equilibrium is
preferable to the other and subjects ￿nd it di¢ cult to coordinate on one.2 Second, it is di¢ cult
to see from a behavioral perspective why players should coordinate on an equilibrium with large
payo⁄ di⁄erences (as it is the case in a Stackelberg leader-follower outcome). It is well known
that many subjects in experiments exhibit an aversion against disadvantageous inequality. Such
inequality aversion might render the Stackelberg equilibria unappealing candidates for convergence
in an experiment.
In this paper, we want to further explore the reasons for the failure of the theory by inves-
tigating a timing game with a unique and symmetric equilibrium. The basis of the experiments is
1Huck, M￿ller and Normann (2002) investigate Hamilton and Slutsky (1990)￿ s action commitment game. M￿ller￿ s
(2005) experiments are on Saloner￿ s (1987) model, extended by Ellingsen (1995). Fonseca, Huck and Normann (2005)
analyze endogenous timing with asymmetric cost, as modelled by van Damme and Hurkens (1999).
2Most of the theoretical literature has ignored the coordination problem ￿rms face in a duopoly with endogenous
timing. An exception are van Damme and Hurkens (1999, 2004) who analyze a timing game with cost di⁄erences
between ￿rms. In their models, a unique Stackelberg equilibrium with the e¢ cient ￿rm as the Stackelberg leader is
selected. However, Fonseca, Huck and Normann (2005) still observe simultaneous play as the modal case in related
experiments.
2Hamilton and Slutsky￿ s (1990) extended game with observable delay in a quantity-setting frame-
work. The equilibrium of this extended timing game is in simultaneous moves and has equal
quantities as ￿rms have symmetric costs. Hence, in our experiments, neither coordination failure
nor inequality aversion should hinder the predictive power of the theory. Our conjecture is that
the theory will be con￿rmed in the new experiments. If symmetric outcomes fuelled by inequality
aversion have been previously observed even though they were not predicted, then it seems likely
that the theory will be vindicated if symmetric outcomes are predicted.
A second novelty is that we run experimental sessions both with randomly matched par-
ticipants as well as with participants in ￿xed duopoly pairs. Previous experiments have simulated
one-shot interaction (random matching) between participants since the endogenous timing models
are based on static games. However, repeated interaction is always a possibility in the ￿eld. Since
we want to investigate the behavioral forces supporting or contradicting the prediction of the tim-
ing game, it seems intriguing to analyze ￿xed matching as well. With ￿xed matching, collusion
becomes a possibility and then the timing of duopoly decisions may have an entirely di⁄erent na-
ture (on which we elaborate in the next section). Further, ￿rms should be better able to resolve
coordination failure problems with ￿xed matching.
As with previous studies, our results do not fully support the theory. Many timing decisions
are out of equilibrium. Subjects often delay their output decisions though producing early is the
dominant strategy. This suggests that additional forces not captured in the endogenous timing
models in￿ uence participants￿decisions. In particular, we argue below that our results are consistent
with recent ￿ndings of Tykocinski and Ru› e (2003). Their results suggest that subjects often have
a preference to delay their decisions even when waiting does not provide any additional information.
2 Model and predictions
In Hamilton and Slutsky￿ s (1990) extended game with observable delay two ￿rms can produce in
one of two possible periods (period 1 or 2). A pure strategy for ￿rm i = 1;2 is a choice of a
production period ti 2 f1;2g and a set of functions ￿i : f(1;1);(1;2), (2;1) ￿ R+;(2;2)g ! R+
which is ￿rm i￿ s quantity choice as a function of production periods, (t1;t2), and the output of ￿rm
j 6= i when ￿rm i is the Stackelberg follower. Given the decisions to produce in period 1 or 2, ￿rms
will not mix over outputs.
3In the experiments we used the following linear inverse demand function
p(q1 + q2) = maxf30 ￿ (q1 + q2);0g (1)
where qi denotes ￿rm i￿ s output. Linear costs of production in both periods were given by
Ci(qi) = 6qi; i = 1;2: (2)
Pro￿ts are denoted by ￿i = p(q1 + q2)qi ￿ 6qi:
Consider the predictions in the static game ￿rst. We start with the second stage. In the
subgame with t1 = 1 and t2 = 1; ￿rms play the simultaneous-move Cournot equilibrium in period
1 with qi = 8 and resulting in payo⁄s of ￿i = 64 (i = 1;2). The same holds in the subgame with
t1 = 2 and t2 = 2: In the subgame with t1 = 1 and t2 = 2; ￿rms play the Stackelberg equilibrium
with ￿rm 1 choosing qL
1 = 12 in period 1 whereas ￿rm 2, the Stackelberg follower, chooses qF
2 = 6
in period 2. This implies payo⁄s of ￿L
1 = 72 and ￿F
2 = 36. Outputs and payo⁄s for the subgame
with t1 = 2 and t2 = 1 are qL
2 = 12;qF
1 = 6 and ￿L
2 = 72 and ￿F
1 = 36. Then we go back to the ￿rst
stage. From ￿L
i = 72 > ￿i = 64 (if tj = 2) and ￿i = 64 > ￿F
i = 36 (if tj = 1); choosing period 1
is a dominant strategy and thus we have t1 = t2 = 1 in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
With repeated interaction in the ￿xed matching sessions, it is well known that collusion
can occur (Selten and Stoecker, 1986). It is easy to verify that qi = 6 is the symmetric joint-pro￿t
maximizing strategy which results in payo⁄s of ￿i = 72 (i = 1;2). Given both ￿rms collude, the
timing decisions are immaterial. However, if there is some uncertainty about the other players￿
willingness to collude, timing decisions may play an important role. For example, producing at
ti = 2 may resolve the uncertainty whether the other player colludes, and at ti = 2 non-colluding
rivals may also be punished. Producing at ti = 1 provides an opportunity to signal collusive intents.
Note that if these incentives for moving ￿rst or second materialize, they would be rather di⁄erent
from those in the static endogenous timing models.
3 Experimental design and procedures
The experimental markets were designed so as to implement the extended game with observable
delay one-to-one. The game was repeated over 30 rounds in order to allow for learning both with
random and ￿xed matching.
A minor di⁄erence to the game as formally stated above is that subjects had to choose their
quantities from a truncated and discretized strategy space, yielding a standard payo⁄ bi-matrix.
4Subjects had to choose integer quantities between 3 and 15.3
In both treatments, subjects got individual feedback about what happened in their market
at the end of each round. That is, the computer screen4 showed the production period, the quan-
tity, and the pro￿t of both duopolists. In sessions with random matching (henceforth Random),
subjects were rematched by the computer at the beginning of each round. We conducted ￿ve ses-
sions with ten participants each. The two sessions with ￿xed matching (henceforth Fixed) had
ten participants as well, so there were ￿ve ￿xed duopoly pairs in each session. Treatments were
conducted in an identical way, except for the matching scheme.
The experiments were conducted at Royal Holloway, University of London, in spring and
summer 2002. Altogether 70 subjects participated in the experiment. They were students from
various departments, many from ￿elds other than economics or business administration.
In the instructions (see Appendix A) subjects were told that they would act as a ￿rm which,
together with another ￿rm, serves one market, and that in each round both were to choose when
and how much to produce. After having read the instructions, participants could privately ask
questions.
Before the ￿rst round was started subjects were asked to answer two control questions
(which were checked) in order to make sure that everybody had full understanding of the payo⁄
table.
The monetary payment was computed by using an exchange rate of 300 ￿points￿for one
pound sterling and adding a ￿ at payment of £4.5 Subjects￿average earnings were $13:02 ($19:53
at the time) including the ￿ at payment. The sessions lasted about 60 to 90 minutes.
4 Experimental results
We report the results of treatments Random and Fixed separately. When discussing the results,
we often refer to third 1 (rounds 1-10), third 2 (rounds 11-20), and third 3 (last ten rounds).
4.1 Random matching
Table 1 shows the evolution of the relative frequency of t=1 choices over time. In Random the
relative frequency of t=1 decisions increases from 57% to 72% (from third 1 to third 3). This is
3We used the same matrix as in Huck, M￿ller and Normann (2001).
4We are grateful to Urs Fischbacher for letting us use his software toolbox ￿z-Tree￿(Fischbacher, 1999).
5This payment was made since subjects could have made losses in the game.
5third 1 third 2 third 3
Random 57 69 72
Fixed 50 51 53
Table 1: Relative frequency of period 1 choices
third 1 third 2 third 3
t = 1 t = 2 t = 1 t = 2 t = 1 t = 2
Random t = 1 9.0; 9.0 10.6; 7.8 9.0; 9.0 10.3; 8.9 8.7; 8.7 9.3; 9.0
t = 2 7.8; 10.6 8.3; 8.3 8.9; 10.3 9.1; 9.1 9.0; 9.3 8.5; 8.5
t = 1 t = 2 t = 1 t = 2 t = 1 t = 2
Fixed t = 1 9.0; 9.0 9.2; 8.4 9.4; 9.4 9.0; 8.0 9.7; 9.7 8.5; 7.7
t = 2 8.4; 9.2 9.0; 9.0 8.0; 9.0 9.2; 9.2 7.7; 8.5 7.6; 7.6
Table 2: Average individual quantities in the subgames over time
a clear trend towards equilibrium timing behavior. However, the relative frequency of t=1 choices
is still below the equilibrium prediction of 100% towards the end of the experiment. Moreover the
increase slows down considerably from third 2 to third 3.
Since we have random matching, the relative frequency of timing decisions immediately
imply the relative frequencies of the timing outcomes. The equilibrium prediction with both ￿rms
choosing t=1, occurs with only 55% (third 3). Simultaneous play in t=2 occurs with 10% and
sequential play with the remaining 35% (third 3). Since t=1 choices increase over time, the relative
frequency of the subgame where both ￿rms choose t=1 increases whereas the frequency of the other
two subgames decreases.
Once ￿rms have made their timing choices, they know in which sequence they choose their
outputs. How do ￿rms behave in the subgames? Table 2 shows average individual quantities across
thirds contingent on the timing decisions. In Random, we observe that after a short learning
phase (third 1) the t1=t2=1 and t1=t2=2 subgames are virtually identical. They are also close to
the Cournot prediction. However, in the asymmetric subgame, attempts to exploit a ￿rst-mover
advantage by choosing a higher than Cournot quantity of 8 is punished by followers.6 Note, for
6Interestingly, the fraction of subjects (9) who choose to delay 22 times or more are more competitive Stackelberg
6instance, that the best response to a ￿rst mover￿ s quantity of 10 and 9 is 7 and 8 respectively.
Moreover, ￿rst-movers￿output is smaller than predicted (12 units).
As a consequence, both Stackelberg leaders￿and followers￿payo⁄s are smaller than the
payo⁄s in the two simultaneous subgames7. In fact, the payo⁄s in the Cournot subgame in t=1
are higher than in any other subgame.8 This provides an incentive for the subjects to avoid the
sequential-move subgame by coordinating on the t=1 Cournot subgame, thus avoiding to choose
production in t = 2. Note also that, over time, Stackelberg leaders become less competitive and
Stackelberg followers less punitive such that payo⁄ di⁄erences become less extreme and, thus, the
incentive to avoid the sequential-move game gets weaker. This might explain why the increase of
t=1 choices gets slower over time. We also note that subjects choosing period 1 earn on average
higher payo⁄s over time than subjects choosing period 2.9 The pro￿t ￿gures are 51.6 and 47.3 (third
1), 48.9 and 41.6 (third 2), and 54.4 and 49.9 (third 3) after t=1 and t=2 choices respectively.
It is instructive to compare these results to those reported in Huck, M￿ller and Normann,
2002 (henceforth HMN). Their experimental design is identical to ours but the one major di⁄er-
ence is the timing game. HMN used Hamilton and Slutsky￿ s (1990) extended game with action
commitment. In this game, a ￿rm can move ￿rst only by committing to an output. When doing
so, the ￿rm does not know what its competitor is doing. By waiting until the second period, a
￿rm can observe the other ￿rm￿ s ￿rst period action. Theory predicts the emergence of Stackelberg
equilibria.10
The surprising insight from the comparison to HMN is that results di⁄er only marginally￿
though predictions based on subgame perfectness oppose each other. In HMN, the relative frequency
of t=1 decisions is 56%, 65% and 62% across thirds. These numbers are very close to ours in the
￿rst two thirds and only somewhat smaller towards the end of the experiment. Note that in our
experiment ￿rms have a strict incentive to choose t=1 (they can only lose by choosing t=2) while,
followers than the overall average.
7Signi￿cant at the 5% level using a Wilcoxon signed ranks test, where each observation corresponds to the average
pro￿ts across players from a session.
8The di⁄erence between Cournot in period 1 and Stackelberg leader and Stackelberg follower, respectively, is
signi￿cant at the 5% and 10% level, respectively, using a one-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test. The di⁄erence
between the two Cournot outcomes is not testable, due to an insu¢ cient number of observations.
9This is, however, not signi￿cantly di⁄erent at any conventional level of signi￿cance (two-tailed Wilcoxon signed
ranks test).
10More precisely, there exist two Stackelberg equilibria and one ￿rst-period Cournot equilibrium, but only the two
Stackelberg equilibria are in undominated strategies.
7in the extended game with action commitment, ￿rms have a weak incentive to delay (as they can
play a best reply to whatever the rival ￿rm did in t=1). Nevertheless, aggregate t=1 choices are
rather similar in both studies.
The similarity of market outcomes in both experiments is also illustrated by a look at the
frequency of Cournot outcomes (that is, both ￿rms choosing quantity 8, regardless of the timing
decisions). In Random we ￿nd 16.0% and in HMN 14.4% Cournot outcomes. Another telling
statistic is the ratio of market shares. We calculate the number s := maxfq1;q2g=minfq1;q2g for
each individual market and for each round. The average s for the markets in HMN is 1.27 (standard
deviation 0.36) and 1.33 (standard deviation 0.48) in Random. Thus, the ratio of market shares
in the current study (in which symmetric Cournot outcomes are predicted) is not smaller than in
the previous experiment where asymmetric Stackelberg outcomes are predicted.
4.2 Fixed matching
Let us now consider treatment Fixed. Table 1 above also shows the evolution of the relative
frequency of period-1 choices in Fixed. In contrast to Random, period-1 choices stay roughly
constant at a level of 50%. The frequency of timing outcomes is not immediate from Table 1 as
they depend on individual duopoly pairs. We ￿nd that the frequency of the predicted t1=t2=1
subgame increases from 17% to 32% (from third 1 to third 3). Surprisingly, the frequency of the
t1=t2=2 subgame increases, too, from 17% to 26%. As in treatment Random, the frequency of
the sequential subgame decreases from 66% to 42%, but it is modal in all thirds.
Table 2 reports average quantities. With the exception of the t=1 Cournot subgame, outputs
are generally smaller compared to Random, indicating a tendency to collude. We note that output
produced in the ￿rst-period simultaneous subgame is always slightly higher than the Cournot
quantity of 8. Whilst the Cournot output in t=1 appears to be larger in Fixed,11 we observe that
average outputs in the sequential subgame, as well as in the t=2 Cournot subgame are smaller in
the Fixed treatment (and also smaller than the predicted output of 8.) Third, both Stackelberg
leaders and followers in treatment Fixed are less competitive than those in treatment Random12
but they do not appear to collude (on average). This implies that in treatment Fixed there is less
of an incentive to avoid the sequential subgame by choosing t=1.
11This di⁄erence is not signi￿cant (one-tailed Mann-Whitney U test).
12This is signi￿cant at the 1% level regarding the Stackelberg followers, but not regarding the Stackelberg leaders
(one-tailed Mann-Whitney U test).
8As expected from the lower quantities, pro￿ts are generally higher in Fixed. More precisely,
average pro￿ts after choosing period 1 and period 2, respectively, are 50.8 and 49.4 (third 1), 50.1
and 49.3 (third 2), and 50.3 and 60.3 (third 3), respectively. Hence, timing decisions do not seem
to a⁄ect pro￿ts very much in the ￿rst two thirds but towards the end of the experiment subjects
seem to coordinate more e⁄ectively in the t1=t2=2 subgame. The fact that the frequency of both
simultaneous subgames rises over time can by and large be explained by observing that some pairs
tend to coordinate on t=1 whereas others tend to coordinate on t=2. Recall that production costs
are the same in both periods.
5 Discussion
Hamilton and Slutsky￿ s (1990) extended game with observable delay has a unique and symmetric
subgame perfect equilibrium in which both players choose to produce in the ￿rst period, implying
symmetric Cournot quantities. In this paper we report on an experimental test of this prediction.
We run the game both with a random and a ￿xed matching scheme. With random-matching, we
￿nd that timing choices move in the right direction but they do not converge to the predicted level
as nearly one third of all subjects still chooses to delay toward the end of the experiment. With a
￿xed-matching scheme we ￿nd that the subgame perfect equilibrium has no predictive power with
regard to timing choices as throughout the experiment only half of the timing observations are
period one choices. The di⁄erences in timing choices in the two treatments can to some extent be
explained by the di⁄erences observed in the asymmetric subgames. In the treatment with random
matching more competitive behavior in the asymmetric subgames provides an incentive to avoid it
by choosing to produce early. This is not the case in the treatment with ￿xed matching as here the
behavior in the asymmetric subgames is less competitive.
The ￿nding that timing choices do not converge to the predicted level suggests that there
must be preferences that cause subjects to delay their decisions. Recently, Tykocinski and Ruf-
￿ e (2003) documented that such preferences exist. Their study is about ￿reasonable reasons for
waiting￿ . Experimental subjects had to choose between two options in a certain scenario and an
uncertain scenario. It turned out that subjects often prefer to delay their decisions even when
waiting does not provide any additional information at all.
While it is di¢ cult to compare these individual decision experiments to our strategic context,
one can draw parallels. Our results indicate that subjects sometimes prefer to wait even when
9doing so puts them at a strategic disadvantage. When choosing period two, our subjects can
￿nd out which action the rival ￿rm has chosen, provided this rival chose the ￿rst period. Even
though they become the Stackelberg follower in this case, they prefer to wait, perhaps to resolve
the strategic uncertainty about the other player￿ s action. Once subjects are more familiar with
the experimental environment, this preference to wait is getting weaker in the random-matching
treatment. Nevertheless many subjects still delay towards the end of the experiment.
With ￿xed matching, these considerations may be less relevant since subjects face less
ambiguity regarding choices of their opponent. As argued above, timing choices may not re￿ ect
the incentives suggested by non-cooperative game theory. Instead, timing choices may turn out to
be an instrument to support collusion. While we observe only little collusion in our experiments,
our results suggest that timing decisions do not a⁄ect pro￿ts by very much with ￿xed matching
(except towards the end of the experiment).
We found that our results with random matching are similar in many respects to those in
Huck, M￿ller and Normann (2002) where, however, Stackelberg equilibria are predicted. Gener-
ally, previous work13 found that endogenous timing models predicting asymmetric outcomes are of
limited behavioral relevance due to coordination failure and inequality aversion. The results in this
study show that there are forces su¢ ciently strong to prevent play from converging to a unique
equilibrium of an endogenous timing model even if the equilibrium is symmetric.
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11Appendix
A Instructions (not for publication)
Welcome to our experiment! Please read these instructions carefully! Do not talk to your neighbours
and keep quiet during the entire experiment. If you have any questions, please give us a sign. We
will answer your question privately.
In our experiment you can earn di⁄erent amounts of money, depending on your behaviour
and that of other participants matched with you. All participants read identical instructions.
You have the role of a ￿rm which produces the same product as a second ￿rm in the
market. First you have to decide, at which time you want to produce. Afterwards, you decide on
the quantity you want to produce.
Regarding the time when to produce, you can choose either the ￿rst or the second production
period. As the other ￿rm has the same choice, there are four possibilities. Both ￿rst, both second,
you ￿rst and the other ￿rm second, and you second and the other ￿rm ￿rst. In all cases, you will
be informed about the timing decision of the other ￿rm before choosing your quantity.
The quantity decisions are made in the sequence resulting from the timing decisions. If
both ￿rms choose ￿rst or both choose second, quantity decisions are made simultaneously. In those
cases, you and the other ￿rm have to make the quantity decisions not knowing what the other one
chooses. If you choose ￿rst and the other ￿rm second, then the other ￿rm will learn your quantity
decision before making its own decision. Likewise, if you choose second and the other ￿rm ￿rst,
then you will learn the other ￿rm￿ s output decision before making your own decision.
Note that the pro￿t in each round depends only on the chosen quantities, not on the choice
of production periods. In the attached payo⁄ table, you can see the resulting pro￿ts of both ￿rms
for all possible choices of quantity. The table reads as follows: At the head of a row the quantity
of your ￿rm is indicated, at the head of a column the quantity of the other ￿rm is stated. In the
cell at which row and column intersect, your pro￿t is noted in the lower left and the other ￿rm￿ s
pro￿t is stated in the upper right. All pro￿ts are expressed in a ￿ctional currency, which we call
￿Points￿ .
The experiment lasts 30 rounds. After each round, you will be informed about the quantity
choice of the other ￿rm, your pro￿t and the other ￿rm￿ s pro￿t.
12You do not know with which participant you serve the market. You will be randomly
matched with a participant each round. This random move is done by the computer.
Anonymity is kept among participants and instructors, as your decisions will only be iden-
ti￿ed with a code number. You will discreetly receive your payment at the end of the experiment.
Concerning the payment note the following. At the end of the experiment, your earnings
in Points determine your payment in pounds sterling. For every 300 Points you will receive 1 £. In
addition to this payment, you will receive the show-up fee of 4 £ independently of your earnings
during the thirty rounds.
13B Payo⁄ table (not for publication)
































































































































































































































































































































































The head of the row represents one ￿rm￿ s quantity and the head of the column represents the
quantity of the other ￿rm. Inside the box at which row and column intersect, one ￿rm￿ s pro￿t matching this
combination of quantities stands up to the left and the other ￿rm￿ s pro￿t stands down to the right.
14